Teaching self-control: road safety and traffic education in postwar Germany by Nowak, Kai
www.ssoar.info
Teaching self-control: road safety and traffic
education in postwar Germany
Nowak, Kai
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Nowak, K. (2016). Teaching self-control: road safety and traffic education in postwar Germany. Historical Social
Research, 41(1), 135-153. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.41.2016.1.135-153
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46553-7
Historical Social Research 41 (2016) 1, 135-153 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.41.2016.1.135-153 
Teaching Self-Control. Road Safety and Traffic 
Education in Postwar Germany 
Kai Nowak ∗ 
Abstract: »Selbstkontrolle lehren. Verkehrssicherheit und Verkehrserziehung in 
der frühen Bundesrepublik«. In the 1950s, the Federal Republic of Germany had 
to cope with a situation referred to at the time as “Verkehrskrise” (traffic cri-
sis). In a relatively short time span, the number of cars on German roads had 
increased rapidly, as well as the number of accidents and fatalities. Correspond-
ingly, efforts in traffic education were heavily intensified. By examining public 
campaigns and expert discourse, the article explores how the notion of self-
control gained more and more acceptance among road safety experts, and 
eventually helped to establish a paradigm change in Western German traffic 
education. In the course of the three decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, the 
focus shifted from enforcement by appealing to reason and disciplinary en-
deavors to the internalization of adequate behavior on the road and compe-
tence behind the wheel. Traffic education aimed to motivate road users to reg-
ulate themselves and to improve their ability to adapt to traffic situations. It 
tried to establish a specialized “seventh sense” as the core element of vernacu-
lar risk practices on the road. The notion of self-control, as implemented in 
public campaigns and other road safety activities, relied on societal models and 
certain notions of social and political order. These included, in particular, tradi-
tional family and gender roles, Christian religious values, and democratic free-
dom. Therefore, road traffic can be regarded as a cultural concept with road 
safety as a discursive arena. In that sense, road safety does not appear as a 
static state but was in a state of flux just as traffic itself was. Thus it required 
self-control and routinized yet flexible practices to improve the resilience of 
each individual road user to the risk of accidents as well as the resilience of the 
traffic system itself. 
Keywords: Road safety, traffic education, traffic policy, motor car, Federal Re-
public of Germany, public campaigns, expert discourse, self-control, risk, resili-
ence, pedagogy, morality, values, gender roles, infrastructure, technology. 
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1.  Introduction 
In 1954, Werner Schöllgen, a catholic moral theologian at the University of 
Bonn, wrote an article for the Zeitschrift für Verkehrssicherheit (Journal of 
Road Safety).1 What we find there is the following observation:  
Our roads, traffic signs, warning signs in front of railroad gates et cetera, as 
well as the technical features our means of transport are equipped with already 
meet the demands of safety standards to such a high degree that the actual and 
in fact biggest problems of road traffic do not concern these aspects anymore. 
Rather, the problem is the individual road user, because he is an inaccurate, 
erratic being, prone to failure, simply a living creature (Schöllgen 1954, 105). 
Road safety is neither a mere problem of technology that can be solved by 
improvements in road building, city planning, and vehicle safety, nor is it a 
legal one that simply takes a thorough amount of state regulation and control. 
Not alone can engineers and planners, politicians and police be considered road 
safety experts, but also people like Schöllgen: philosophers, psychologists, and 
teachers. Road safety was a sociopolitical task, focusing particularly on the 
road user. From this perspective, road safety experts at large considered traffic 
accidents to be a “moral problem.” As such, they concluded, traffic education 
was a suitable means of tackling the problem (Meyer and Jacobi 1959). 
In the 1950s, the Federal Republic of Germany had to cope with a situation 
referred to at that time as “Verkehrskrise” (traffic crisis). In a relatively short 
time span the number of motor bikes, cars, and trucks on German roads had 
increased rapidly and so had the number of accidents. In 1960, Germany had 
almost four times as many vehicles than ten years before; their number had in-
creased from almost 2,000,000 to 7,600,000. In the same period, the number of 
fatalities had almost doubled from 7,300 to 14,000, while the number of injuries 
due to traffic accidents even tripled in a decade. Starting from 150,000 injuries in 
1950, the count raised to 430,000 in the year 1960 (Klenke 1993, 353-6; Kuhm 
1997, 241). Correspondingly, the government, schools, automobile clubs, as 
well as mass media heavily intensified their efforts promoting traffic education. 
Most of these efforts were connected with the Verkehrswacht, a non-
governmental organization dedicated to road safety that was re-established in 
1950 with essential support from the West German federal government, after 
                                                             
1 The Zeitschrift für Verkehrssicherheit was founded in 1952 by prosecutor Konstantin Leh-
mann, who ran the journal as editor-in-chief for ten years. It had a decidedly interdiscipli-
nary approach and was open to jurists, psychologists, engineers, physicians, through to soci-
ologists and theologians. Thus, the journal aimed at representing the breadth of the field 
and emphasized that it regarded road safety as a multifaceted task which required diverse 
expertise. Yet, particularly in its first years, the circle of contributors appears to have been 
rather eclectic since some of the authors were autodidacts with regard to road safety, who 
did not always keep up with scientific and methodological standards. 
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the National Socialists had forced its “voluntary” liquidation in 1937 (Klenke 
1993, 83-91; Hochstetter 2005, 395). In the course of the 1950s, traffic education 
was more closely integrated in school curricula. Exams were offered for pedestri-
ans and cyclists, “traffic rooms” were established in schools and public libraries 
as well as mobile training grounds in school yards, while the voluntary crossing 
guard service was expanded, and in 1956 the “Verkehrskasper,” a soon to be 
popular puppet show and figure, started its activities next to an increasing num-
ber of educational films and public campaigns.  
Stemming from this observation of what amounted to an explosion in traffic 
education activities, this article begins with a few – rather sketchy – remarks on 
how actual risk and the debate on road safety may relate to each other. A dis-
cussion then follows of how the notion of self-control in road traffic is related 
to this debate by drawing upon the work of Norbert Elias. The subsequent 
section focuses on the question of how the ‘human factor’ was addressed in 
expert discussions and public campaigns, exploring how the debate on self-
control evolved and was established as an important if not leading concept in 
German traffic education in the 1950s and 1960s. In order to do so, the analysis 
will draw mostly on discussions held within contemporary road safety journals 
such as the interdisciplinary Zeitschrift für Verkehrssicherheit (Journal of Road 
Safety), Verkehrswacht-periodicals, and ADAC-Motorwelt, the membership 
magazine of Germany’s largest automobile club. 
In the following pages, this article argues that endeavors to promote road 
safety blended state regulation and expert-based conduct with self-control in 
order to establish a specific modern form of civilized behavior with regard to 
road traffic. Self-control relied on certain notions of social and political order 
and, at the same time, helped to establish them. This process could not be deter-
mined by the state, as self-control essentially relied – and still relies – on vernacu-
lar risk practices, a risk culture that is, according to Arwen Mohun (2013, 1), 
made up of a “set of rules, customs, and beliefs,” shaped in everyday life and 
“passed informally from person to person, reinforced through the authority of 
experience and social status.” But traffic education that approached its audience 
top-down could at least give road users incentives for disciplining themselves, 
which were closely connected with moral values and ideas of democratic free-
dom and personal responsibility. Thereby the principle of self-control was consti-
tuted and seemingly undermined at the same time, this paradox being a prerequi-
site for the mechanism to work. The notion of self-control helped to establish a 
paradigm change in Western German traffic education, which occurred over the 
course of three decades from the 1950s to the 1970s: The focus shifted from 
enforcement by appealing to reason and by disciplinary endeavors to the inter-
nalization of adequate behavior on the road and competence behind the wheel. 
It thus changed from a static, technocratic view of road traffic that thought in 
terms of controllability to a more dynamic understanding that paid tribute to its 
inherent contingency. Therefore, traffic education was increasingly focused on 
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improving the resilience of the traffic system by improving road users’ resili-
ence in coping with its shortcomings – both systemic as well as personal.  
2.  Roads and Risk 
Using roads may result in undesirable consequences: Road traffic entails haz-
ards for each person’s property, physical health, and life. In the early days of 
automobilism, the motor car was at the center of a hard-fought struggle about 
priorities and responsibilities on the road. The vehicle was a complete game 
changer that required a renegotiation process which mainly took place in the 
contested space of the road itself. At times, the protests against the hazards 
induced by higher speeds and reckless driving became violent and created new, 
possibly life-endangering hazards in turn. Some protesters even stretched steel 
ropes across roads (Fraunholz 2002; Norton 2008). On the other hand, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the hazards of the road acted as a source of 
pleasure for some (mostly male) drivers, who had cultivated a sporty, even 
aggressive style of driving. In this context, a traffic accident was considered a 
“heroic paradigm of modernity” and a source of social prestige similar to war 
injuries (Möser 1999, 164).  
The need to contain these social frictions as well as the increasing death toll 
was obvious. Generally, there were three approaches to minimizing risk on the 
road: First, this was filtered through efforts in engineering, e.g. improvements 
in the construction of roads, the segregation of traffic lanes by setting up desig-
nated areas for different means of transport like pavements, bikeways, etc. 
(Ishaque and Noland 2006), or new developments in vehicle safety (Stieniczka 
2006). Second, regulation and enforcement through traffic law, traffic signs, 
and police control imposed or at least enjoined proper behavior on the road 
(Meyer and Jacobi 1959, 183-6). Third, traffic education aimed at conditioning 
road users. The early days of automobilism in Germany saw private driving 
schools popping up and initial efforts at bringing traffic education to primary 
schools followed by its institutionalization in the course of the 1920s with the 
Verkehrswacht as the leading actor (Fack 2000a, 2000b). Since then, road traffic 
has become an increasingly extensive, systematic, and basically risky endeavor 
that has been securitized and thereby politicized. Road traffic became a subject of 
safety-related practices, most importantly of safety communication. An expert 
discourse emerged which produced and distributed safety-related knowledge, 
thus trying to deal with risk systematically. These practices focused not only on 
the prevention of accidents or on mitigating the results of accidents as, at the 
same time, they addressed road traffic as such and its preconditions, require-
ments, and consequences. As a result, the diversifying activities of traffic educa-
tion were targeted at establishing trust in the traffic system. They should suggest 
reliability and create a collective perception of security and safety, because 
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increasingly one could expect everyone else to have at least a basic knowledge 
of appropriate behavior. In this way they circulated notions of modern society.  
In this respect, risk turns out to be a social construction, since it is all about 
the perception of contingency and dealing with it – on an individual as well as 
on a social level. As it is completely uncertain when or whether the possible 
instances and effects of damage, injury or death will occur and who will be 
involved, risk perception is more or less like viewing an uncertain future (Mo-
hun 2013, 5). Alternatively, statistics like accident rates help measure the 
chance of accidents occurring, but in turn are always subject to interpretation. 
Statistics are used by experts in order to securitize road traffic, thus rendering it 
a safety issue. Dangers cannot be completely avoided, though. It still remains a 
fact that, by participating in road traffic, people somehow have to cope with the 
associated risks if they do not want to avoid traveling by car. However, this is 
not an option for most in an increasingly mobile world because it proves to be 
difficult to evade the promises of motorization: participation in the benefits an 
affluent society offers, as well as the extension of the individual radius of mo-
bility. The debate on road safety continuously had to balance personal demands 
for self-fulfillment and requirements of public safety and security, respectively, 
the individual and the common good. 
Accordingly, the question at hand, and the one that preoccupied the experts, 
is: To what degree is the risk inherent to the automobile age manageable for 
society as a whole, as well as for each individual road user? Consequently, 
endeavors in road safety to a lesser extent aim at achieving a safe or an as-safe-
as-possible state. But what is safe anyway? Of course it should entail enabling 
road users to travel preferably unharmed. But at the core road safety is more 
about improving the acceptance of risk. Thus, it aims in particular at creating 
trust in the road traffic system as such and the car as a means of transportation. 
This was more important at times when traffic planners and politicians to an 
overwhelming degree tried to promote individual motor traffic, which was the 
case in Germany at least in the 1950s and 1960s.  
However, as Arwen P. Mohun has shown, road safety is not based solely on 
systematic efforts deployed top-down. These efforts are rather closely linked 
with vernacular risk practices, which give weight to common knowledge and 
experience. With regard to road traffic, vernacular risk culture centers around a 
figure that might be called: the good driver. He (in safety discourse less often: 
she) is always in full control of the vehicle and is able to assess any risky situa-
tion correctly. However, particularly good drivers have a mind of their own: 
They do not abide by every regulation, if it seems justifiable. That is why sys-
tematic endeavors at road safety also try to ‘infiltrate’ vernacular practices with 
sanctioned conduct (Mohun 2013, 164-5). This could be achieved, as a growing 
number of experts in traffic education were convinced, with the help of the 
concept of self-control. 
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3.  Self-Control 
Road traffic is a complex, highly interdependent sociotechnical infrastructure 
system distinguished by overlapping interests, different travel speeds, a pluri-
centric structure which impose the highest requirements on the discipline of 
every single road user. Roads, aside from motorways, induce uncertainties and 
insecurities because they are public spaces with their usage not clearly prede-
fined. Since the nineteenth century, they have evolved from being a habitat to 
interconnected spaces of networks and flows, which required the synchroniza-
tion of a steadily increasing volume of traffic. Therefore road traffic is regarded 
as virtually paradigmatic for late industrial modernity (van Laak 2016). But 
how can security and safety be produced under conditions which are character-
ized less by personal commitment than by reliable procedures and practices? 
According to Norbert Elias, people have to adapt their conduct to those of 
others due to the increasing complexity of modern societies and the process of 
functional differentiation. Elias holds that, in the “civilizing process,” external 
constraints are transformed into self-constraint. This adaptation cannot simply be 
determined top-down by state regulation and control, but, of course, it can be 
accompanied and guided. Self-control is instilled in people during their socializa-
tion process and in their daily lives. Socially accepted conduct that is internalized, 
in this view, is much more effective than external control, because as a phenome-
non made up of latency and willfulness at the same time it is not as easily prone 
to inner resistance as interventions on behalf of a third party (Elias 1997, 327-
30). With regard to road safety, all efforts at traffic education aim to motivate 
road users to regulate themselves. Self-control and the expectation that others will 
control themselves as well produce stable behavior patterns, and by that, predict-
ability. By such means, the contingency of road traffic is reduced and the per-
ception of road traffic as potentially too hazardous is softened. 
While Elias finds self-control primarily located in subconsciousness, the ac-
tivities of traffic educators in the 1950s, mainly consisting of teaching rules and 
appealing to an individual’s responsibility, were still geared to rational insight. 
This becomes apparent in campaign slogans like “Open your eyes in traffic” 
(“Augen auf im Straßenverkehr”) or “Pay attention to others” (“Achte auf den 
Anderen”). However, at the end of the decade, a controversial discussion about 
the significance of preconscious conduct for road safety set in, led in (semi-) 
academic journals by the use of catchwords like “automatisms” or “reflexive 
driving behavior.” 
The starting point was the observation made by psychologists that, due to 
high complexity and speed of traffic flows, there was not enough time, and 
drivers’ cognitive abilities were insufficient, to adequately assess situations on 
the basis of understanding alone. Instead, when a risky situation occurs, a driv-
er often spontaneously reacts in the “correct” way even if inattentive (Leonhard 
1957, 10). This is because subconsciously perceived signals trigger sequences 
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of action that run automatically. Single elements of these are rarely explicable. 
One example: The perception of a red light is followed by the act of reducing 
speed, pushing the clutch, shifting down, braking, etc. until the vehicle finally 
comes to a stop (Schmitz 1958, 17-8). The advocates of automatism urged 
traffic educators to give more weight to constant repetition, for instance on 
training grounds, in order to habitualize appropriate sequences of action (Leon-
hard 1957, 9-10; Franke 1961, 101-2). 
However, the notion of automatisms was quite strongly contested because it 
appeared too static for requirements imposed by a highly dynamic traffic sys-
tem. Actually automatisms were accepted as an effective instrument to improve 
road safety only as far as they were conceptualized with regard to disciplining 
the body. This means for example the guidance of the driver’s eyes through the 
reading of traffic signs or road markings (“Keep in your lane!”) as well as the 
complex relationship between body and vehicle (Urry 2006). Even though 
body related techniques were seen as equally essential for governing the road 
infrastructure system and the implementation of self-control, road safety ex-
perts raised serious concerns because the notion of automatisms undermined 
the topos of freedom on the road:  
The modern man, who was educated in the spirit of freedom and human digni-
ty and is eager to preserve these values, is reluctant to submit himself to auto-
matic and mechanical procedures, like a small cog in a big machine, without 
the possibility to decide autonomously (Löw 1961).  
Eventually, personal freedom and the voluntary decision to comply with traffic 
regulation was the most important element of self-control, if not the secret of 
its success. 
4.  Road Safety and the 'Human Factor' in Postwar 
Germany 
In the 1950s, there was a mostly unchallenged consensus among the German 
road safety expert community that next to efforts in road building, disciplining 
road users was the key for improving safety and solving the so-called “traffic 
crisis” (Altmeier 1957; HH. 1960). In October 1951, the Federal Minister of 
Transport, Hans-Christoph Seebohm, had already emphasized the importance 
of self-discipline as a goal of traffic education in a parliamentary speech.2 But 
how could self-discipline be achieved?  
Road safety activities took place within discursive orders, based on 
knowledge and corresponding practices as well as technologies of the self. 
                                                             
2 Parliamentary speech, Federal Minister of Transport, Hans-Christoph Seebohm, 171th plena-
ry session, Oct. 25, 1951, 7045-9. 
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These constituted the power to discourage or encourage courses of action. 
Besides the state and state-run institutions, many non-governmental organiza-
tions and networks of experts from science to legal professionals were involved 
in elaborating, rationalizing, and organizing this program and carried it into the 
last angle of the private sphere. Thus, road safety essentially drew on preexist-
ing power structures in education and family environments in order to establish 
mechanisms of self-control, which relied on societal models and certain notions 
of social and political order, and at the same time helped to establish them. 
These were, in particular, traditional family and gender roles, Christian reli-
gious values and democratic freedom – all of which played a major role in 
traffic education and its campaigns. 
Figure 1: Safety Campaign Targeting Women 
 
Source: Deutsche Verkehrswacht, April 1960. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, women were rarely addressed directly by road safety 
campaigns. Their behavior behind the wheel was not in question as they were 
already regarded as decent drivers, who are well acquainted with traffic law. 
Hence several 1950s safety adverts presented women as role models, even 
though at that time this was mostly as non-motorized road users (Figure 1).3  
                                                             
3 A neither representative nor methodically sound traffic count from 1958/59 revealed that 
only 5% of car drivers were female, whereas the percentage of female cyclists came to 28% 
(Linden 1960, 23). 
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Figure 2: “Listen to your Wife – Drive Carefully” 
  
Source: Deutsche Verkehrswacht, June 1957. 
 
Only occasionally were women portrayed as responsible for creating hazardous 
situations, for instance due to an allegedly natural lack of self-confidence be-
hind the wheel (Sjövall 1955), or even because they distracted their driving 
husbands by chatting too much (Leonhard 1957). Instead, men were considered 
as prone to accidents because they seemingly acted out their masculinity on the 
road (Denecke 1958). Thus, almost all road safety campaigns were aimed at 
male drivers. Some of them made use of domestic power structures in order to 
indirectly exert influence on men. In the 1950s a popular campaign by the 
Verkehrswacht tried to get access to reckless drivers traveling alone, reminding 
them: “Listen to your wife – drive carefully!” In one picture the specter of a 
woman with a wagging finger accompanies the man in his car. He has her on 
his mind while driving. Moral imperatives and societal control at home were 
meant to be converted into self-control on the road (Figure 2).  
In another example from a 1959 campaign, a poster shows a worried child 
and its mother awaiting the safe return of their father and husband, which – un-
derlined by a sinister light setting at dusk – should remind him of his responsibil-
ity for his loved ones. Besides pointing to the social control exerted by family 
members, this poster implicitly drew upon imaginations of accident and death 
and the impending social and financial consequences for relatives (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: “Get Home Safely!” 
 
Source: Bundesminister für Verkehr (1990, 40). 
 
Women were assigned a “passive role” (Baumgarten 1960) in most of the cam-
paigns of that decade, suggesting that they were only indirectly affected by 
fatalities. This changed in the course of the 1960s and 1970s. Now there were 
observers who inverted former interpretations, stating that in the end men and 
their paternalism were to blame if women were involved in accidents, because 
they prevented them from becoming safer drivers (Bretz 1968). And in road 
safety campaigns, women not only gained more importance as an audience, but 
were even granted the status of being as adept on the road as male drivers. Never-
theless some road safety posters depicting women still targeted men by relying 
on sexist stereotypes that were well-known in product advertising (Figure 4). 
Since the road can be regarded as an arena of morality, it is no surprise that 
the churches were also active in this field. Since the beginning of traffic educa-
tion, they had tried to establish a specifically Christian traffic ethos by – among 
other means – referring to the fifth commandment (“You shall not kill”) and 
preaching – literally – safe driving with regard to others as every Christians’ duty. 
There were dedicated sermons and prayers (Katholische Bundesarbeitsgemein-
schaft Verkehr 1964), from time to time road safety was featured in church jour-
nals,4 and small pictures of Saint Christopherus, the patron saint of travelers, 
were handed out to drivers, who could fill in their blood type on the reverse 
                                                             
4 Letter from Katholisches Büro Bonn to Kuratorium “Wir und die Straße,” Bundesarchiv, B 
108/2666, 374-86. 
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side,5 while motorway churches, to which hurried travelers could retreat and seek 
spiritual guidance, indicated a close connection between god and car drivers. 
Aside from actual church activities, there is a whole host of Christian imagery 
used in road safety language: A mid-1950s Berlin poster campaign tells drivers to 
behave like a road angel (“Sei auch du ein Engel im Verkehrsgedrängel”), and 
the roadside assistance service offered by the German automobile club ADAC 
operates under the name “yellow angels” (“Gelbe Engel”). Most notably, a traffic 
offender in the German language is called a sinner (“Verkehrssünder”). This term 
explicitly refers to confession, for hundreds of years one of the most effective 
Christian techniques of governing souls. But it still aims at the promise of salva-
tion, which everybody is able to reach by himself, if he tries to fulfill a certain 
ethos. Since the road was considered an arena of negotiation with regard to moral 
values, the rather close involvement in road safety activities corresponded to the 
churches’ endeavors in re-Christianizing public life after 12 years of Nazi rule 
(Kleßmann 1993; Gabriel 1996). However, just as the churches’ public authority 
diminished due to liberalization tendencies in the 1960s and 1970s, traffic educa-
tion in general saw a decrease in religious references, although churches kept up 
their own road safety initiatives. The semantics of sin still remained in use, since 
it had been well established for a long time. 
Figure 4: Poster Drawing upon Sexist Stereotypes Recommends to Better Wear 
a Seatbelt than to Drive Topless (1974) 
 
Source: German Safety Council – Deutscher Verkehrssicherheitsrat (DVR). 
                                                             
5 Minutes of the advisory board of Kuratorium “Wir und die Straße,” April 26, 1960, Bun-
desarchiv B 108/2665, 132-6. 
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Secularized values that traffic education referred to included – to name the 
most prominent – chivalry, courtesy, being a gentleman, showing responsibility 
and good manners on the road. These appealed to the self-perception of one’s 
character, which was one important way to tackle the problem of self-control: 
“Don’t let your car make a bad person out of you” was the slogan the 
Verkehrswacht used in their priority program in December 1959, which at-
tempted to establish proper manners behind the wheel (Deutsche 
Verkehrswacht 1959a). The same year, 1.5 million copies of a Verkehrswacht 
flyer were circulated that drew heavily on traditional gender roles and that at 
the same time tried to change associated behavior. It read: “Decency is pure joy 
for real men with lots of horse power” (Deutsche Verkehrswacht 1959b). So, 
traffic education not only aimed at reducing risky driving behavior but also 
tried to convey notions of desirable forms of communal life. One road safety 
expert suggested communicating more often with other road users using ges-
tures through the car windows to overcome the social isolation that was in-
duced by the automobile age. Another one seconded this idea, arguing that this 
could successfully “defrost the Cold War on the roads” (v. F. 1958).  
At the same time road users could, in the eyes of experts, express their civic 
virtues and political convictions by behaving properly. Therefore, traffic educa-
tion was considered a means of civic education for the newly established de-
mocracy in Western Germany. In 1958, a grammar school teacher painted the 
picture of the road as a suitable training ground for appropriate civil and civilized 
behavior where Germans could prove their maturity. On the road, they could train 
themselves in exercising the democratic freedom of their own choice – but, of 
course, in accordance with common rules and limited by a sense of responsibility 
for their fellow citizens and the political and social order as such (Seitzer 1958). 
In 1959, this balance still was missed by a Verkehrswacht member, who com-
plained that after the experience of war, the postwar years filled with deprivation 
and the economic miracle with its dog-eat-dog mentality, competition, and self-
ishness ruled the road as well. Instead he claimed: “Democracy means […] delib-
erate and wise integration in the community and its necessities” (Lienen 1959). 
However, such an expectation had already turned out to be little more than 
wishful thinking a few years earlier. In 1953, the speed limit inside towns had 
been abolished in order to facilitate self-responsibility and to practice a demo-
cratic attitude. In this regard the bill was directed against the national-socialist 
traffic policy, which had demanded subordination to the “traffic community.” 
Now the notion of freedom on the road was considered crucial for a democratic 
Germany, with the motor car as its symbol. The struggle between a collectivist 
and an individualist approach, thus between the past dictatorial regime with its 
traditions and continuities and the democratic present, was also fought out 
through traffic policy (Klenke 1995, 41-4). But at the core, transport minister 
Seebohm aimed to remove one of the alleged obstacles of motorization. Ironi-
cally, the bill had the abatement of accidents in its name, but the number of 
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fatalities in urban areas rose quickly. The attempt to realize democratic free-
dom and reeducation by means of road safety proved to have rather deadly 
consequences. In 1957, the speed limit of 50 km/h was finally restored (Klenke 
1995, 17-8; Praxenthaler 1999, 19-21). 
Even if it obviously failed in terms of accident prevention, in the long run 
the notion of freedom was vital for establishing self-control. The successful 
internalization of an ethos of a democratic traffic system, representing freedom, 
prosperity, and a desired way of communal living, was a key factor. It seeming-
ly laid the pursuit of happiness in everyone’s own hands. Thus, the conver-
gence of individual and community should be deliberately favored by citizens 
themselves. In that sense, (personal) freedom is a necessary condition in liberal 
democracies, but it is bounded by a dispositive of security and safety, albeit not 
in a complementary way. As the concept of self-control shows, in liberal socie-
ties, security and safety are actually produced by freedom (Packer 2003). 
Despite all the efforts at enforcement and education, appealing to road us-
ers’ manners and teaching traffic rules was not enough, as a glimpse at the 
statistics unmistakably revealed. Subsequently, experts tried to reassess current 
concepts in traffic education. In this context, a changed perspective on road 
traffic gradually became prevalent. More and more it was regarded as an open, 
highly dynamic, interconnected infrastructure system with a multitude of au-
tonomous users with a will of their own. In this conception, risk had to be 
accepted as an inherent element which could neither be denied nor eliminated 
completely, but should become manageable. Hence, contingency was no longer 
only considered to be a fundamental problem leading to accidents. Instead 
contingency should be utilized for traffic education in a productive way (Brun-
ner 1958, 359; Franke 1961, 82-7; Munsch 1961). In this context, the notion of 
self-control became more and more central. Such a traffic system required “a 
high degree of elastic adaptation” from its users, as one expert put it (Franke 
1961, 90). Others stated that there could be situations where not conforming to 
compulsory behavior could actually even prevent accidents. Therefore, traffic 
education should renounce the idea of teaching a predefined code of conduct 
which pretends to be always totally clear, and stop insisting on compliance at 
any rate (Munsch 1961). The metaphor of elasticity, however, pointed to a 
certain fuzziness, a gray area of adaptation, that could not be handled either by 
fixed patterns of behavior or by disciplining and regulation. In this context, 
traffic psychologists brought preconscious conduct to the fore again, and 
thought about which parameters could possibly stimulate the emergence of a 
“practical, nonreflective intelligence, that intuitively let one do the right thing” 
(Brunner 1958, 360). Traffic education, they argued, should “shape attitudes, 
that leave road users a certain latitude and enable them to adapt to the variety 
of specific traffic situations” (Franke 1961, 91-2; cf. Hebenstreit 1961).  
The practitioners in the field of road safety translated these thoughts into the 
catchword “Verkehrssinn” as a means of inserting self-control into subcon-
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sciousness (Munsch 1966). They started to reflect upon what they called a 
“seventh sense.” A good driver, they claimed, does not need to think about how 
to behave properly on the road – he simply does. He always has the contingen-
cy of road traffic in the back of his mind and anticipates potentially hazardous 
situations – thus, hardly knowing any by himself. However, if there is one, he 
instantly knows how to avoid harm (Lidl 1960). But there is more to it than 
simply experienced driving. The term suggested a new, specific body sense, a 
second nature, vital for survival in late industrial societies (Merki 1999, 52-3). 
Besides anthropological connotations, the notion also relied on social control to 
enforce self-control: Traffic educators often remarked that drivers who had 
gained a fairly good seventh sense were surrounded by an aura of safety, which 
in turn encouraged others to get in his car – and on the contrary, that nobody 
liked to join drivers who did not have a seventh sense (Lidl 1960).  
But how could traffic education successfully stimulate the emergence of a 
seventh sense? Besides stressing the importance of constant driving training, 
experts demanded that driving schools and other means of traffic education 
should concentrate on teaching and practicing anticipatory skills. In particular, 
drivers should develop a specialized “traffic vision,” the ability of visual atten-
tional control located in subconsciousness (Munsch 1962). In this regard, edu-
cational films became more important, and the notion of a seventh sense gained 
huge popularity until it was adopted by the TV show of the same name which 
was broadcast between 1966 and 2006 (Ebeler 1986; Wind 1990). 
The career of self-control and a seventh sense implied two fundamental 
shifts in perspective that saw resilience put forward as a paradigm of road 
safety and accident prevention: Whereas in the 1950s, the road safety dis-
course, and thus traffic education, first and foremost had concentrated on ex-
ceptional situations of dysfunction by trying to reduce traffic accidents and 
mitigate their consequences, the guiding principle of the seventh sense was the 
smooth operation of the traffic system (Munsch 1961). Moreover, road users, 
hitherto the object of traffic education, increasingly became its subject. In 
1971, the newly established German Road Safety Council launched a long-
running campaign that explicitly centered on road users, their interests, self-
perceptions, and abilities. One of its core elements was a series of posters 
which were displayed at autobahns and major roads. Each poster presented an 
adept user of the road (“Könner”), a skillful, responsible, and calm driver who 
seemed like a personification of the seventh sense. Slogans used were, for 
instance, “Könner keep their distance” or “Könner wear a seat belt” (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: “Könner Keep their Distance” 
 
Source: German Safety Council – Deutscher Verkehrssicherheitsrat (DVR). 
 
Those drivers, the campaign suggested, do not need enforcement as they have 
internalized adequate behavior as well as good manners through their own free 
will. They express competence with regard to their own safety and those of 
others.  
5.  Conclusion  
Traffic education in postwar Germany over the years did not just stick to the 
goal of reducing the number of accidents. It also focused on normal operations 
in road traffic and positively offered desirable models of sociopolitical order 
and communal life. Implementing self-control was an essential goal of those 
road safety endeavors. Evidently that applied in particular when freedom as a 
fundamental societal value coincided with an open and pluricentric infrastruc-
ture system. In liberal democracies, state regulation is inherently a difficult 
task, certainly more difficult to achieve than in dictatorial regimes. While also 
utilizing mechanisms of self-control to some degree, the “Third Reich” decid-
edly relied much more on inclusion and exclusion. The Nazis transferred the 
idea of Volksgemeinschaft to road traffic. Who dared to put himself outside the 
German traffic community (Verkehrsgemeinschaft)? But to their own confu-
sion, the Nazi-ideologists recurrently had to state that even innumerable good 
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“Volksgenossen” willingly ignored such appeals and refrained from adopting 
their driving behavior (Hochstetter 2005, 381-5). 
Nevertheless, in 1950s traffic education, there were quite a few continuities 
with the Nazi period, not only regarding people who could still count on their 
expert status. Some tried to preserve the Nazi idea of community, while others 
even stuck to the terminology (Mühlhaus 1953). Nor was the notion of self-
control completely new, let alone the only paradigm in effect. While it was 
widely in discussion, other, older ways of addressing still remained in use, for 
instance paternalism, as a campaign picture from 1957 shows: A traffic signal 
in the guise of a Berlin policeman looks down on his subject (Figure 6).  
But it is not too surprising that the ‘human factor,’ and correspondingly the 
notion of self-control, gained increasing attention in the traffic education of 
democratic postwar Germany. As a non-governmental organization, yet one 
closely related to the state, the Verkehrswacht – originally founded in 1924 – is 
strongly associated with the republican form of government and with the idea 
of a civil society (Klenke 1993, 85). By relying on the commitment of thou-
sands of volunteers, the Verkehrswacht sent out the message: Everyone could 
become a road safety expert! 
Figure 6: Berlin Dialect and Prussian Paternalism: “Can't you pay attention?" 
  
Source: Deutsche Verkehrswacht, March 1959. 
 
In the 20th century, and even more in the period of mass motorization, road 
traffic was more than a central economic factor for industrial societies. It was a 
cultural concept with road safety as a discursive arena. Therefore, safety was 
no static state that could be predefined; it was in a state of flux just as traffic 
itself was. Thus it required self-regulation and routinized yet flexible practices 
in order to improve the resilience of each individual road user to the risk of 
accidents as well as the resilience of the traffic system itself. Therefore, road 
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safety in the light of the self-control paradigm, which emerged from the late 
1950s on, can be considered part of a specific security dispositive, the regime 
of risk prevention through immunization (Bröckling 2012, 96-9). The aim of 
implementing self-control and a corresponding ethos of road traffic heavily 
relied on vernacular risk practices, which traffic education tried to influence in 
the sense of overseeing a long-term change from risk affinity to the presence of 
a specialized seventh sense of safety. Road risk was to appear manageable.  
The securitization of road traffic was a constant task, a constant process of 
negotiation. Not only because increasing traffic with increasing speeds seem-
ingly meant increasing risk, but also because of ever new generations of young 
people entering the roads and because of shifting degrees of waywardness that 
could be tolerated. Even more importantly it was because of changes in society 
itself and its guiding principles. Traffic education had to adapt to these changes 
if it wanted people to adapt. 
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